Immigrant legislation, across and within the United States by Reich, Gary
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial 
use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and 
Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017742005
Research and Politics
October-December 2017: 1 –11
© The Author(s) 2017





The paralysis of US immigration policy at the federal level 
now means that policymaking is centered at the state level, 
where legislatures have passed thousands of laws address-
ing immigrant-related issues over the past decade. 
Explaining disparate state responses to immigration has 
been the focus of a growing body of research, with some 
researchers focusing on the rise of anti-immigration state 
laws (Ybarra et al., 2016; Zingher, 2014; Marquez and 
Schraufnagel, 2013; Reich and Barth, 2012; Turner and 
Sharry, 2012; Schildkraut, 2001) and others emphasizing 
the relative mix of pro- and anti-immigrant state legislation 
(Gulasekaram and Ramakrishan, 2015; Rivera, 2014; 
Monogan, 2013; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty, 
2011; Boushey and Ludtke, 2011).
Because the growth of state immigration legislation fol-
lowed the expansion of immigration flows into states that had 
little past experience with immigration, a key issue within 
existing research has been the extent to which state activism 
reflects demographic pressures resulting from increases in 
immigration versus a politically-motivated shift towards either 
punitive or accommodating policies (Gulasekaram and 
Ramakrishnan, 2015). Existing research has yielded contra-
dictory findings. Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan find restric-
tive legislation unrelated to state demographic change but 
rather a function of polarized partisan politics. By contrast, 
Monogan (2013), Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 
(2011), and Boushey and Luedtke (2011) generally find parti-
sanship unrelated to state legislation, with Boushey and 
Luedtke presenting evidence that larger immigrant popula-
tions induce more integrative state legislation. However, their 
results also suggest that larger foreign-born populations were 
significantly related to restrictive legislation and that the 
growth of immigration was positively related to both integra-
tion and control policies. Zingher (2014) finds that both legis-
lative conservatism and the growth of immigration propelled 
restrictive legislation while Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013) 
and Ybarra et al. (2016) present evidence of a more focused 
backlash against Hispanic immigrants. However, Marquez 
and Schraufnagel’s results again suggest a contradiction, with 
the growth of state Hispanic populations also associated with 
increases in pro-immigrant legislation.
An unresolved problem in existing research is the fail-
ure to address two sources of causal heterogeneity. First, 
existing studies often fail to consider whether increased 
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legislative activity necessarily alters the overall tenor of 
state legislative output. Because immigrant legislation 
spans multiple issue areas (education, health care, law 
enforcement, labor laws, professional licensing, welfare 
benefits), states produce varying mixes of accommodat-
ing and restrictive legislation. As a result, an increased 
volume of one type of law (restrictive or accommodating) 
may not necessarily change the relative tenor of state 
immigrant legislation. Thus, research designs should 
consider whether variable effects are presumed to affect 
the volume of immigrant legislation, the overall tenor of 
legislation, or both.
Second, researchers have generally ignored cross-state 
versus within-state causal effects at the state level. 
Individual predictors at the state level often simultane-
ously encompass short-term changes observed within a 
state over a given period of time—such as changes in the 
growth of immigrant populations or partisan control of 
government—and cross-sectional effects that are static 
over the course of most observational studies: the same 
variable also registers that some states are whiter, more 
Republican, or have larger immigrant populations than 
others. The problem is that in the presence of both causal 
effects, as Bell and Jones (2015) show, a single measure 
represents an uninterpretable, weighted average of these 
two effects. In situations where variables encompass both 
a time-varying, “within-unit” process as well as a time-
invariant, “between-unit” effect, Bell and Jones argue for 
a random effects estimation strategy that separately 
measures these two effects. This approach creates sepa-
rate coefficients that distinguish time-variant and time-
invariant effects. “Within-unit” effects for each 
time-varying independent variable are calculated by sub-
tracting the (in this case) state mean from the value of 
each observation:
x xij j−
where each i represents an observation—here, a legislative 
year—of variable x in state j and x j  is the mean of that 
variable across all observed years in state j. “Between-unit” 
(i.e., cross-state) effects can then be estimated using the 
mean value of the same variable at the state level x j , in 
addition to any other exclusively time-invariant meas-
ures, z j . In this manner, average contextual differences 
across states can be distinguished from time-varying 
within-state effects. This “between” versus “within” hierar-
chical approach is presented below for a dataset of state 
immigration laws approved between 2005 and 2012. The 
models separately measure the absolute number of each 
type of law produced as well as the relative balance of 
accommodating versus restrictive legislation. At the same 
time, variable effects are measured so as to distinguish 
within-state changes over time from more time-invariant, 
cross-state differences.
Independent variables
Between-state variables. Many variables that have figured 
prominently in recent research differ across states, but not 
(over the course of existing observational studies) within 
states, including the following variables:
(1) Institutions of direct democracy (Turner and Sharry, 
2012; Reich and Barth, 2012 Schildkraut 2001). 
Differences in the presence and strength of direct 
democracy are captured here via Lewis’s (2011) 
“Direct Democracy Impact” measure, normalized 
to range from 0 (No citizen initiatives) to 5 (Highly 
influential direct democracy).1
(2) Legislative professionalism (Monogan, 2013). 
Squire’s (2007) measure of legislative professional-
ism (measured here as 0 through 100) captures dif-
ferences between professional and citizen legislatures 
over the period 2005 through 2012. This variable is a 
weighted combination of legislative salary, days in 
session, and staff per legislator (as compared with 
members of Congress during the same year).
(3) The growth of the state Latino population, 2000–
2010 (Ybarra et al., 2016; Marquez and 
Schraufnagel, 2013). This variable is included to 
capture the specific effect of Latino immigration, 
which may differ from that of immigration among 
all nationalities (see below) and has been linked to 
restrictive legislation.2
(4) Citizen ideology (Monogan, 2013). This is meas-
ured as the percentage of the state population in 
2005 that self-identified as liberal, based on public 
opinion data used by Pacheco (2011).
(5) Immigrant State Welfare Eligibility (Filindra, 2013; 
Hero and Preuhs, 2007). The 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunities 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) afforded states dis-
cretion to define standards for immigrant welfare 
eligibility. The welfare policies that states estab-
lished in the period following PRWORA can be seen 
as establishing a baseline level of accommodation or 
restriction that may influence subsequent legisla-
tion; thus, the direction of legislation between 2005 
and 2012 may display continuity with immigration 
welfare policy regimes established post-PRWORA. 
State variations in defining immigrant welfare eligi-
bility are captured via Hero and Preuhs factor-score 
measure, which is based on nine welfare-related 
policy items and ranges from -1.11 (exclusive) to 
1.67 (inclusive).3
Within-state variables. Other variables identified in recent 
research contain both a cross-sectional and a time-varying 
effect, with the time-varying component measuring changes 
within states between 2005 and 2012:
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(1) Percent foreign-born population (Nicholson-Crotty 
and Nicholson-Crotty, 2011; Boushey and Ludtke, 
2011; Monogan, 2013).4 Note that the cross-state 
average measures the “stock” of immigrants between 
2005 and 2012, while the within-state variable meas-
ures changes in the size of the immigrant population 
(the “flow” component) during that same period.
(2) Change in per capita state income, lagged one year 
(Filindra and Pearson-Moskowitz, 2013; Ybarra 
et al., 2015).5
(3) Republican party control (Zingher, 2014). Two 
measures operationalize this effect: the percentage 
of Democratic state legislators (averaged over both 
state legislative chambers), and Republican control 
of both the executive and legislative branches 
(measured dichotomously).
(4) Latino legislative representation (Preuhs, 2007), 
measured as the percentage of Latino state legisla-
tors, averaged over both legislative chambers.6
Dependent variable and estimation procedure
The dependent variables are derived from an original coding 
of 1393 laws approved by state legislatures between 2005 
and 2012.7 The data is grouped by state and legislative year, 
yielding 371 observations across 8 years (see Table A1 in 
online appendix for additional information on the coding 
protocol and a summary of laws approved in each state).8 
Two types of laws are analyzed. Accommodating legislation 
sought to make public services, employment, state licenses, 
and housing more accessible to immigrant populations, 
regardless of their legal status. Restrictive legislation sought 
to bar access to the same goods and outcomes and/or enlisted 
state and local law enforcement in efforts to identify unau-
thorized immigrants. Following most recent work on state 
immigration legislation (Ybarra, 2015; Marquez and 
Schraufnagel, 2013; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-
Crotty, 2011; Boushey and Ludtke, 2010), unweighted 
counts of each type of law are used; the presumption is that 
counts of legislative output speak meaningfully to the 
importance of immigrant-related issues across legislatures 
as well as the policy intentions of legislators.9
As is common with panel data, the counts of accommo-
dating and restrictive state legislation are “overdispersed” 
(the variance is greater than the mean). Following Gelman 
and Hill (2007: 326) and Bell and Jones (2015: 147), over-
dispersion is incorporated directly by including random 
effects at both the state and the observation level, yielding 
a three-level, Poisson regression:
Y  Poissonij ~ e






1 0 1  (1)
α µ β βj j j jX z u= + + +2 3
In this model, the number of laws approved in legislative 
year i in state j (Yij) is a function of the vector of “between-
state” (αj) and “within-state” covariates, βij. The between-
state components include the state-level means xij( ) , time 
invariant measures (zj), and a random state-level effect 
(uj). The variance at the observation level, ε, includes the 
additional random effect ε1ij ij jx x−( )  that captures varia-
tion beyond that explained by the Poisson regression (i.e., 
overdispersion). The random effects are assumed to be dis-
tributed normally.10 Posterior means and standard devia-
tions are estimated via Bayesian Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) resampling.11 Because immigration-
related legislation (both restrictive and accommodating) 
increased steadily in almost all states between 2005 and 
2012, a linear trend is included, with each year indexed as 
one through eight. The year index was statistically signifi-
cant for both pro- and anti-immigration legislation, while 
also improving the overall fit of the models, as indicated 
by a lower Bayesian deviance information criterion.12 The 
Woolridge test for autocorrelated errors in panel data 
(Woolridge, 2002) failed to reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation.
Findings: Revisiting state legislation
Table 1 provides both the incidence rate ratio (IRR) and 
standard deviations for each variable, with asterisks indi-
cating particularly robust directional effects: for a positive 
(negative) posterior mean, it indicates that less than 5% of 
its posterior distribution contains negative (positive) val-
ues.13 Models 1 and 2 illustrate the importance of distin-
guishing cross-sectional from time-varying effects. Model 
1 suggests that the count of accommodating legislation 
increased with the share of Democratic legislators within a 
state: each percentage increase in Democratic legislative 
representation increased the count of accommodating laws 
by approximately 5% per year. However, the “between 
state” coefficient shows that states that averaged higher 
Democratic representation over the period 2005 to 2012 
were actually associated with a 2% reduction in the annual 
count of accommodating legislation.
Demographic and economic effects are also marked by 
different within- and between-state effects. Within states, 
restrictive laws increased by 52% for every percentage 
increase in the immigrant population. But states with 
larger immigrant populations passed more of both types 
of immigrant legislation: the average size of the immi-
grant population was associated with a 5–7% annual 
increase in both restrictive and accommodating legisla-
tion. Changes in state per capita income were also related 
to immigration legislation, consistent with Ybarra et al. 
(2016). However, their study only examined punitive state 
laws. By contrast, Models 1 and 2 show that each percent-
age increase in per capita income (the “within-state” 
effect) is associated with, respectively, a 4% and 8% 
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decrease in both accommodating and restrictive legisla-
tion, suggesting that immigrant legislation became less 
salient to legislators as state income grew. These distinc-
tions were not possible in existing research, either because 
researchers collapsed state legislative output over multi-
ple years (losing the time component) or did not distin-
guish within- versus between-state variable effects.
Other variables in Models 1 and 2 are more closely 
associated with one type law than the other. Citizen ideol-
ogy, direct democracy, and the share of Latino legislators 
are strongly associated with counts of restrictive legisla-
tion, but less so with accommodating legislation. In 
Model 2, restrictive legislation increased by 21% for each 
unit increase in Lewis’s six-point “Direct Democracy” 
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Bayesian DIC 1024.92 1108.19  
N 371 371  
Mean and standard deviation estimates based on a burn-in period of 10,000 iterations and 200,000 post burn-in samples.
* The direction (+/-) of the posterior mean has a greater than 95% probability, based on posterior distribution.
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index, and decreased by 10% for each percentage increase 
in citizen liberalism and Latino representation. The cred-
ible interval indicates a greater than 95% posterior prob-
ability of these directional effects. By contrast, 
accommodating legislation is closely associated with 
more generous welfare benefits for immigrants: each per-
centage increase in the IW eligibility scale increased the 
count of accommodating laws by 61%, which translates 
into 1.7 more accommodating laws per legislative year 
from the lowest to highest observed values of the scale. 
Still other variables commonly cited in existing research, 
such as legislative professionalism, the growth in state 
Latino populations, and Republican control, had more 
ambiguous effects, with wide credible intervals that 
encompassed both increases and decreases in each type 
of immigration legislation.
Of course, as argued above, changes in the volume of each 
type of law do not address shifts in the relative balance of 
legislative output. Table 2 uses a multinomial logistic model 
to compare three legislative outcomes. In some instances, leg-
islatures approved more restrictive (R) laws than accommo-
dating (A) laws. This outcome, R>A, constitutes the base 
category in Table 2, and is contrasted to outcomes in which 
accommodating legislation predominated (A>R), and accom-
modating and restrictive laws were approved in equal num-
bers (A=R).14 Relative risk ratios (RRR) estimate the effect of 
a one-unit change in each variable on the probability of the 
A>R and A=R outcomes relative to the base category, holding 
all other variables constant.
The results suggest that partisan effects were important 
to the relative balance of laws, consistent with Gulasekaram 
and Ramakrishnan (2015), but in nuanced ways. In states 
where Republican control of legislative and executive 
branches was more common, the odds of a relatively 
accommodating outcome (A>R) were 81% lower (RRR = 
0.19) compared to the “restrictive dominant” (R>A) out-
come, a directional effect with a greater than 99% poste-
rior probability (PP). A similar, but weaker directional 
effect occurs between the “neutral” outcome (A=R) and 
the R>A base category (RRR = 0.45, PP = 82%). Thus, 
although Table 1 suggests that Republican control of state 
government was not strongly associated with the volume 
of either accommodating or restrictive legislation, Table 2 
suggests that it moved the balance of legislative output in 
a restrictive direction. Likewise, within states, each per-
centage increase in Democratic legislative representation 
increased the odds of the accommodating outcome over 
the restrictive base outcome by 8% (PP = 99%) and by 5% 
for the A=R outcome (PP = 83%). However, legislatures 
that averaged higher Democratic representation across the 
period 2005 to 2012 were actually less likely to shift 
toward a relatively more accommodating stance. Taken 
together, Tables 1 and 2 suggest an interesting legislative 
dynamic: more Democratic-leaning states were actually 
less likely to adopt a more accommodating tone toward 
immigrants, except as the share of Democratic legislators 
within the state increased.
Table 2 further clarifies the directional effects of eco-
nomic and demographic variables. As the average size of 
the foreign-born population increased, states were more 
likely to be, on balance, accommodating (RRR = 1.06, 
PP = 92%) or neutral (RRR = 1.12, PP = .95%) rather 
than restrictive. Likewise, each percentage increase in 
average per capita income increased the odds of the more 
accommodating outcome (A>R) over the restrictive out-
come by 59% (PP = 99%), and the neutral outcome by 
90% (PP = 99%). Thus, larger average foreign-born pop-
ulations raised legislative output while higher average 
per capita income reduced output (Table 1); however, 
both variables were positively associated with a shift 
toward less restrictive outcomes, consistent with 
Boushey and Luedtke (2011) and Filindra and Pearson-
Merkowitz (2013).
Table 2 also suggests hypotheses regarding the politi-
cal processes producing each outcome. The odds of the 
A>R outcome compared to the R>A base outcome approx-
imately doubled (RRR = 1.96, PP = 99%) for each unit 
increase in the Immigrant Welfare State and increased by 
5% with average Latino legislative representation (PP = 
99%). Each percentage increase in Latino representation 
within states further increased the relative probability of 
the accommodating outcome over the restrictive outcome 
by 18% (PP = 88%). Thus, growing Latino representation 
decreased the volume of restrictive legislation (Table 1) 
and tilted state legislation toward a relatively more accom-
modating balance (Table 2). By contrast, more direct 
democracy decreased the odds of the accommodating and 
neutral outcomes by, respectively, 11% (PP = 87%) and 
20% (PP = 92%) compared to the base outcome. In short, 
a restrictive outcome was less likely where states imple-
mented more inclusive post-PRWORA welfare benefits 
for immigrants and where Latinos were a larger and grow-
ing share of state legislators. By contrast, stronger institu-
tions of direct democracy reduced the odds of either the 
accommodating or neutral outcomes compared to the 
more restrictive outcome.
Naturally, the results here are time-bound, encompass-
ing an eight-year period when the forces of immigration 
restriction were extremely influential in Republican state 
politics; and because there is no uniform standard for clas-
sifying state legislation, results may vary according to how 
researchers classify state legislation. However, the find-
ings here suggest two guidelines that would provide more 
clarity and consistency to future research. First, given the 
multidimensional nature of immigrant legislation, causal 
arguments need to distinguish variable effects on the vol-
ume of legislation versus the relative balance of laws. 
Understanding whether states end up moving toward a 
relatively restrictive set of policies (e.g., Arizona), more 
accommodating policies (California), or some 
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intermediate outcome depends on this distinction. Second, 
research would benefit from a clearer distinction of within- 
and between-state variable effects where variables encom-
pass both processes. Substantively, many explanatory 
variables simultaneously measure the “pull of history”—
relatively enduring contextual differences across states—
as well as short-term economic, political, and demographic 
shifts. The forces may exert different directional effects on 
legislation, a fact that is obscured when research designs 
include no time component or when variables measure an 
uninterpretable average of both effects.
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Table 2. Relative balance of restrictive (R) versus accommodating (A) legislation (Markov Chain Monte Carlo posterior relative 




































































































Mean and standard deviation estimates based on a burn-in period of 10,000 iterations and 200,000 post burn-in samples.
* The direction (+/-) of the posterior mean has a greater than 95% probability, based on posterior distribution.
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Notes
 1. Lewis created this variable via a principal components factor 
score derived from three variables: (a) legislation insulation, 
(b) the degree of difficulty in qualifying an item on the ballot, 
and (c) the number of times citizen-initiatives were placed on 
state ballots between 1994 and 2006.
 2. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011).
 3. The immigrant welfare (IW) scale is based on immigrant 
eligibility for state health and welfare programs as of 1999, 
including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (both 
before and after the federally-mandated five-year ban), state 
cash payments, food stamps, Medicaid funds, Supplemental 
Security Income, and state health care programs. While there 
is a six-year gap between the IW measure and the start of the 
legislation examined here, the measure establishes whether a 
possible policy trajectory adopted after PRWORA (i.e., as of 
1999) influenced post-2004 state legislation.
 4. The percentage foreign-born population by state was 
obtained from data collected by Pew Research Center’s 
(2014) Hispanic Trends Projection, based on American 
Community Survey data for 2012.
 5. Real state gross domestic product per capita is measured in 
2009 chained dollars and is derived from the US Department 
of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis (n.d.). 
 6. Data from the  National Association of Latino Elected and 
Appointed Officials (2006, 2009, 2010, 2012)
 7. Only laws approved by the legislature were considered, 
although the substantive results are substantially similar 
when resolutions are included. The data were obtained from 
National Council of State Legislatures (2017).
 8. The N of 371 reflects the fact that not every state legisla-
ture produces legislation annually. Legislatures in Montana, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming legislatures 
meet biennially, as did the Oregon legislature until 2012 and 
Arkansas until 2010. Nebraska’s non-partisan legislature is 
excluded from the analysis.
 9. Raw counts also avoid the problem of determining “policy 
relevance,” which involves ambiguous criteria, such as: (a) 
the share of immigrants likely to be affected; (b) effects on 
current immigrants versus future arrivals; (c) gaps between 
legislative intent and implementation/enforcement, and (d) 
symbolic versus substantive effects.
10. The variances are assumed to be normally-distributed in the 
multilevel Poisson model. Alternatively, a negative bino-
mial distribution can be used to fit overdispersed count data 
by including an overdispersion factor. However, such mod-
els use a single parameter to calculate Level 1 and Level 2 
overdispersion, leading Rabe-Hesketh and Skondral (2008: 
394) to advise against them. Regardless, the distributional 
assumption does not appear critical here: coefficients and 
standard errors reported below were virtually identical 
when the model was estimated via a negative binomial 
distribution.
11. Because the data represent a population, rather than a sam-
ple, the goal is to assess the goodness of fit of the models 
rather than infer a population value, as in classical hypothesis 
testing (Gill, 2001). Posterior means and standard deviations 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 are based on 200,000 simulations, 
following a “burn in” period of 10,000 iterations.
12. The significant time trend in Model 1 (b = 0.14, p < .001) and 
2 (b = 0.10, p < .004) suggests unmeasured processes that 
are not easily captured. For example, state legislation may 
reflect the growing politicization of immigration nationwide 
during a period when Congress debated various immigration 
reform proposals or it may also reflect what Gulasekaram and 
Ramakrishnan (2015: 101) call “issue entrepreneur” effects.
13. The incidence rate ratio shows the change in the rate (count) 
of the dependent variable changes with each unit change in 
the independent variable, holding all other variables con-
stant: an incidence rate ratio above 1.00 represents a percent-
age increase in the count, while numbers below 1.00 register 
a percentage decrease in the count.
14. For the purposes of this analysis, legislative years in which 
no immigrant legislation of any kind was approved are 
removed, yielding an N of 286. Distinguishing legislative 
outcomes according to the three categories, reduced the 
measured state-level variance in both Models 1 and 2 to zero. 
Thus, the multinomial logistic models in Table 2 are esti-
mated as single-level models.
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Appendix
Classifying State Immigration Laws 
The data on immigration-related state legislation is derived 
from the National Council of State Legislature Immigration 
(NCSL) Immigration Policy Project. Since the intent is to 
assess both state legislative interest in immigration-related 
issues (i.e. the volume of legislation) and policy direction, 
we coded each law approved by the state legislature during 
the period 2005 through 2012, including those that may 
subsequently have been subject to partial (line item) or 
complete gubernatorial veto (approved laws with a subse-
quent gubernatorial veto constituted 3.5% of the total laws 
passed). In the case of omnibus bills that addressed more 
than one policy area related to immigration, each policy 
area addressed in the bill was included in the legislative 
count and coded separately for intent. This process yielded 
a total of 1,393 laws approved between 2005 and 2012.
State laws were placed into one of three categories: 
accommodating laws or resolutions were defined as those 
intending to provide legal protection and/or access to public 
benefits and employment to immigrants, regardless of their 
legal status (unauthorized or authorized), as well as those 
encouraging federal reforms designed to extend citizenship 
to, and/or discourage the deportation of unauthorized immi-
grants; restrictive laws were those intending to block or 
limit access to housing, employment, and/or public services 
to immigrants, regardless of their legal status (authorized or 
unauthorized), as well as those encouraging the federal gov-
ernment to enhance border security and/or the identification 
and/or apprehension of unauthorized immigrants. Neutral 
laws were defined as those that had no discernible restric-
tive/punitive or accommodating/integrative intent.
To assess the reliability of the categories, two coders 
separately classified all laws and legislation approved in 
2012. Their initial evaluations substantially overlapped (r = 
.77. p<.001). Discordant codings most often related to laws 
placed in the “Neutral” category. Based on the initial cod-
ing, some clarifications were made to the categories. First, 
laws that stipulated clarifications to previously approved 
legislation, but that did not change the intent of the original 
law were coded as Neutral. Second, human trafficking laws, 
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whose intent could be construed as both accommodating or 
restrictive, were to be classified as “Neutral” unless: (a) they 
only contained punitive elements (e.g. punishments for 
human trafficking but no assistance for victims of human 
trafficking), in which case they were coded as Restrictive; or 
(b) they only focused on providing relief to victims of traf-
ficking, in which case they were coded as Accommodating. 
Third, laws authorizing or releasing funds for programs pre-
viously approved were coded as “Neutral” provided no 
change was made to existing legislation.
Subsequent coding was done separately by each coder 
for each legislative year. In instances were coders had 
doubts about the proper classification of laws, these were 
noted and subsequent discussion among the research team 
followed, with the final decision made by the author. For 
purposes of the analysis here, “Neutral” were excluded 
(these comprised 244 of all laws over all states, or 17.4% of 
all laws approved between 2005 and 2012). Thus, the data 
analyzed in Table 1 was comprised of 1,149 laws that fell 
into the “Accommodating” and “Restrictive” categories. 
The three coding categories, and examples of laws placed 
into each category, are as follows:
1. Accommodating:  
Examples:
- Laws protecting immigrants from fraud, theft, abu-
sive labor/business practices (e.g. a “notary public” 
cannot present him/herself as a lawyer) or aiding 
immigrants who are victims of some crime. -Laws 
that ensure that legal immigrants are not denied 
rights or liberties.
- Laws that state that immigrants and/or legal resi-
dents are allowed to practice a profession and/or 
acquire a state license.
- Laws that create a state program that targets or 
assists immigrants.
2. Restrictive:  
Examples:
- Laws that enlist state/local officials in identifying 
or apprehending immigrants or create partner-
ships with federal immigration law enforcement 
authorities.
- Laws that specifically exclude unauthorized or 
authorized immigrants from any state program. 
-Laws that specifically exclude unauthorized or 
authorized immigrants from any profession or 
occupation.
- Laws that mandate verification of immigration sta-
tus for employment or access to state services. 




- Initiation of a cost study or information-gathering 
with no predetermined policy objective (either 
restrictive or accommodating).
- Allocation of money for an expense incurred as 
 a result of immigration (either legal or illegal) 
or distributions of revenue accrued from 
immigrants.
- Human trafficking laws that provided some combi-
nation of penalties for traffickers and assistance to 
victims of trafficking.
- Provisions upholding existing legal requirements/
standards (e.g. providing emergency first-aid ser-
vices regardless of immigration status, banning of 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity). -Laws stip-
ulating legal or technical clarifications to previ-
ously passed legislation that leave the substance of 
that legislation unaltered.
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Table A1. Immigration-Related State Legislation, 2005–2012.




























New Hampshire 3 4
New Jersey 1 3
New Mexico 7 5
New York 21 6
North Carolina 4 5





Rhode Island 4 4
South Carolina 2 31












Table A2. Summary of Variables.
Minimum Maximum Average
Restrictive State Laws (# per legislative year) 0 15 1.67
Accommodating State Laws (# per legislative year) 0 15 1.43
Foreign-Born Population (% of state population)







































Change in Latino Population (%, 2000-2010) 19 148 73
Direct Democracy Impact (0-5) 0 4.99 1.39
Legislative Professionalism (0-100) 2.7 62.6 18.75
Citizen Liberalism (%, 2005) 13 30 20.6
Immigrant Welfare Eligibility, circa 1999 –1.11 1.67 .02
